The Enigma of Veil-Piercing by LEE, Pey Woan
Singapore Management University
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
Research Collection School Of Law School of Law
2015
The Enigma of Veil-Piercing
Pey Woan LEE
Singapore Management University, pwlee@smu.edu.sg
Follow this and additional works at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research
Part of the Business Organizations Law Commons
This Journal Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University. It
has been accepted for inclusion in Research Collection School Of Law by an authorized administrator of Institutional Knowledge at Singapore
Management University. For more information, please email libIR@smu.edu.sg.
Citation
LEE, Pey Woan. The Enigma of Veil-Piercing. (2015). International Company and Commercial Law Review. 26, (1), 28-34. Research
Collection School Of Law.
Available at: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/sol_research/1519
 1 
This is a pre-print version of the article published in International Company and 
Commercial Law Review, Vol. 26(1), pp. 28-34, 2015. 
 
The Enigma of Veil-Piercing 
Pey-Woan Lee* 
 
Abstract: In Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd [2013] 3 WLR 1, Lord Sumption narrowly 
confined veil-piercing at common law to those cases where a controller had used a 
company under his control to evade a pre-existing legal liability. This article argues 
against this approach as it is so narrow that it practically abolished the jurisdiction. 
Instead, the jurisdiction should be preserved, and its exercise should be constrained by 
clearly articulated principles. 
 
Veil-piercing is an enigma of company law. Its existence is almost universally accepted, yet 
it is not a principle reducible to distinct elements. The doctrine, if it exists, is uncertain and 
ill-defined, constructed largely on invectives and metaphors that often furnish no more than 
moral indignation as reason for particular outcomes. Nevertheless, the concept has endured, 
and its appeal remains palpable. Although the institution of the company as a legal person is 
unquestionably the bedrock of modern company law, it is a fiction intended for specific and 
legitimate purposes. Outside these purposes, the fiction may justifiably be dis-applied.1 It is 
no wonder then that when presented with an opportunity to abrogate this unruly doctrine in 
Prest v Petrodel Resources Ltd,2 the Supreme Court elected instead to affirm it. A limited 
power to pierce the corporate veil has to be preserved, if only in a severely attenuated form, 
to counteract abuse. 
Notwithstanding this affirmation, exactly what constitutes “abuse” remains obscure. The 
underlying tension is a familiar one: it concerns the need to mediate between the conflicting 
goals of certainty (as an essential condition for commerce) and flexibility (to redress and 
deter the improper exploitation of legal advantages). In Prest, Lord Sumption sought to 
resolve this tension by first acknowledging, at a general level, the importance of both ends 
but ultimately ascribes far greater weight to certainty through a highly restrictive definition 
of “abuse”. In particular, his Lordship held that the corporate veil can only be pierced to 
prevent a controller from using the company he controls to evade a pre-existing legal 
liability. In both the UK and across the Commonwealth, commentators3 welcomed this 
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development as a definitive step in restoring order and clarity to an area of law hitherto 
plagued by “incautious dicta and inadequate reasoning”.4 This article argues, however, that 
Lord Sumption’s approach is too narrow in that it effectively denies the courts of any real 
power to pierce the corporate veil. It suggests, therefore, that this approach should not be 
adopted in toto. Rather, a true measure of discretion should be conferred on the courts to 
depart from the separate entity rule in exceptional cases. The risks of uncertainty that this 
may entail is best managed by devising principles that constrain the manner by which the 
discretion is exercised, and not by eliminating it in the first place. 
 
Prest v Petrodel Ltd 
In Prest, the issue of veil-lifting arose in a claim for ancillary reliefs following the divorce 
of Michael and Yesmin Prest. At first instance, Moylan J ordered Mr Prest to make, inter 
alia, a lump sum payment of £17.5 million to Mrs Prest. In partial satisfaction of this 
payment, the judge also ordered Mr Prest to transfer to the wife seven UK properties legally 
owned by two offshore companies that he controlled. The latter order was made in 
purported exercise of the jurisdiction under s 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973, which 
empowered the court to order a party to a divorce to transfer to the other such property to 
which the first-mentioned party is “entitled”. Mrs Prest contended that Mr Prest was entitled 
to the companies’ properties on three grounds: first, that the court was entitled, in 
exceptional circumstances, to pierce the corporate veils of the offshore companies; second, 
that s 24 of the Matrimonial Causes Act conferred upon the courts a direct power to pierce 
the veils; and third, that the properties by the companies were held on trust for Mr Prest. The 
Supreme Court unanimously rejected the first two grounds, but found in favour of Mrs Prest 
on the last: that the properties were held by the companies on resulting trust for Mr Prest. 
In the leading judgment, Lord Sumption sought to rationalise the law on veil-piercing by 
distilling two principles from the authorities. First, a court may only pierce the corporate 
veil, or disregard a company’s separate personality, in order to prevent its controller from 
evading a pre-existing legal obligation to which he is bound (the “evasion principle”).5 This 
discretion is a specie of the more general principle that the courts may withhold a legal 
benefit or privilege that is obtained by dishonesty.6 The use of a company to evade the law 
is an instance of such dishonesty. Second, veil-piercing is of no relevance in cases where 
other conventional principles (such as agency or trusts) are applied to uncover the identity of 
the real actors concealed by the interposition of one or more companies (the “concealment 
principle”). Such conventional principles typically do not disregard the company’s separate 
personality. Rather, they are applicable to a company precisely because it is in law a distinct 
person capable of assuming its own rights and duties. To these two principles Lord 
Sumption added a third principle to underscore the residual nature of the veil-piercing 
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jurisdiction: the corporate veil should only be pierced where it is necessary to do so.7 If an 
outcome may be achieved by means other than veil-piercing, that means should be 
employed to the exclusion of the latter. Veil-piercing is, in short, a remedy of last resort.  
As Mrs Prest’s eventual victory was won on trust principles, their Lordships’ observations 
in Prest as to veil piercing are entirely obiter. There is also a stark absence of consensus 
amongst the Law Lords as to how the veil-piercing jurisdiction ought to be demarcated even 
though they were nearly unanimous in recognising its existence. Moreover, while the most 
thorough consideration of the doctrine is set out in Lord Sumption’s judgment, it was not 
adopted in toto by any of the other Law Lords. Specifically, Lord Neuberger agreed that the 
authorities could be classified as either cases of evasion or concealment, of which only 
“evasion” involved piercing in the true sense.8 But he also thought that the evasion principle 
was not founded on any judicial antecedents,9 acknowledging that the evasion principle was 
not a distinct principle concerning veil-piercing but “an aspect of a more conventional 
principle” (that “fraud unravels everything”).10 Baroness Hale (with whom Lord Wilson 
agreed) appeared to accept the “evasion” cases as examples of piercing but doubted whether 
“evasion” and “concealment” exhaustively explained all cases where the company’s 
separate legal status had been disregarded.11 Her Ladyship appeared also to favour a broader 
rationalisation of these cases: that “individuals who operate limited companies should not be 
allowed to take unconscionable advantage of the people with whom they do business.”12 
Lord Mance expressed general agreement with Lord Sumption’s analysis13 but cautioned 
against adopting a position that would foreclose future developments.14 Lord Clarke, too, 
was unwilling to endorse the evasion-concealment distinction without the benefit of full 
arguments.15 Lord Walker, on the other hand, did not think “piercing the corporate veil” 
existed as a distinct doctrine at all.16 Given these disparate observations, it is plain that Prest 
has not delivered the definitive principle that has long eluded judges in this perplexed area 
of law. This may render further development of the law difficult and unlikely.17 Of course, it 
remains possible for a future court to adopt Lord Sumption’s analysis, but that would not 
necessarily be the best way forward given the many difficulties  that surround that analysis.  
 
 
The Evasion Principle 
According to Lord Sumption, the evasion principle is18 
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a limited principle of English law which applies when a person is under an existing legal 
obligation or liability or subject to an existing legal restriction which he deliberately 
evades or whose enforcement he deliberately frustrates by interposing a company under 
his control. The court may then pierce the corporate veil for the purpose, and only for the 
purpose, of depriving the company or its controller of the advantage that they would 
otherwise have obtained by the company’s separate legal personality. 
Support for this principle is located in the classic authorities of Gilford Motor Co Ltd v 
Horne19 and Jones v Lipman.20 In Gilford Motor, the defendant had covenanted not to solicit 
the plaintiff’s customers but subsequently did so through a company he controlled. At the 
plaintiff’s suit, both the defendant and the company were restrained against soliciting the 
plaintiff’s customers. In Lord Sumption’s view, the relief against the company involved 
piercing because “the company was restrained in order to ensure that Horne was deprived of 
the benefit which he might otherwise have derived from the separate legal personality of the 
company.”21 In Jones, a vendor who had a change of heart after contracting to sell a piece of 
freehold land conveyed the property to a company he controlled so as to defeat the 
purchaser’s right to specific performance. The purchaser sued for breach, with the result that 
both the vendor and the company were ordered to convey the property to the purchaser. 
Once again, this was an example of piercing because the company was treated, in those 
circumstances, as having the same obligation that the vendor had to convey the property to 
the plaintiff.22  
Despite this forceful endorsement, it is doubtful if Gilford Motor and Jones are true 
authorities for piercing. The point has been made that both are simply cases in which 
equitable reliefs were granted to effectively remedy a contractual breach. So the restraint 
against the company in Gilford Motor could be explained on a number of grounds: that the 
restrictive covenant, broadly construed, extended to activities of a person (whether legal or 
natural) controlled by the defendant,23 or that the company was acting as his agent,24 or that 
equity would restrain a person inputed with knowledge of the breach.25 None of these 
analyses requires the company and the defendant to be treated as a single entity. In each 
case, the defendant’s control of the company is material only for the purpose of establishing 
the elements of distinct legal principles which did not in any way displace the separate 
entity rule. Likewise, in Jones, the order of specific performance would only have been 
effective if the defendant had been ordered not merely to convey the property, but to do all 
within his power to convey the same. This would include exercising its control over the 
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company to effect the conveyance.26 Alternatively, the order against the company could 
have been justified on the ground that it was, by virtue of the defendant’s control, imputed 
with notice of the purchaser’s prior equity.27 Once again, these interpretations do not require 
the rule in Saloman’s case to be displaced. 
In Prest, Lord Sumption acknowledged the plausibility of these alternative explanations but 
thought that piercing was nevertheless the true ratonale underlying Gilford Motor and 
Jones.28 Yet a plain reading of both decisions will demonstrate that the language employed 
(characterised by liberal reliance29 on the much-disparaged epithets of “cloak”, “sham”, 
“device”, “strategem”, “mask”, “channel” and “creature”) is consistent with a range of 
interpretations as noted above. There is thus no positive evidence that the court in either 
case thought it was departing from Saloman’s case.30  This was also the view of Lord 
Neuberger who, though he endorsed the evasion principle as the exclusive ground for veil-
piercing, nevertheless thought that neither Gilford Motor nor Jones provided any direct 
support for the principle.31 Taken together, these considerations suggest that the evasion 
principle is not supported by the cited authorities.  
Even if it is accepted that the evasion principle encapsulates piercing,  substantial 
uncertainty surrounds its operation. On one view, it will appear that defining piercing by 
reference to the evasion principle has the practical effect of rendering the jurisdiction otiose. 
Its singular focus on the avoidance of a pre-existing legal obligation owed by a company’s 
controller would exclude even egregious wrongdoing. For example, the evasion principle 
(as defined) will exclude fraudulent schemes perpetrated through companies, for “[it] is not 
an abuse to cause a legal liability to be incurred by the company in the first place.”32 
Likewise, fraudulent transfers to defeat creditors’ claims will fall outside the ambit of 
evasion33 since the liability that is evaded in such cases is typically that of the company 
rather than the controller. Crucially, it does not seem that piercing is needed even in the 
archetypal evasion cases (characterised by Gildford Motor and Jones) because such evasive 
conduct can usually be redressed by more conventional remedies. Lord Sumption himself 
admitted as much when he said that “in almost every case where the test [ie, as embodied by 
the evasion pinciple] is satisfied, the facts will in practice disclose a legal relationship 
between the company and its controller which will make it unnecessary to pierce the 
corporate veil.”34 Implicit in this admission also lies the recognition of an extensive overlap 
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between “evasion” and “concealment”, which has prompted some to ask if the distinction 
between the two principles is not in fact illusory.35 
However, the evasion principle may also appear over-extensive on a different view. Thus far, 
it has been assumed that the principle can only be utilised to protect a claimant’s own legal 
right. But a literal reading of Lord Sumption’s formulation may also permit its invocation by 
a third party. Consider an example where A has covenanted not to compete with B but 
subsequently procures C, a company that A controls, to engage in competing activities in 
violation of its covenant. In turn, C contracts with D so as to carry out these activities. If D 
subsequently fails to perform and C brings an action for breach, can D plead the evasion 
principle in defence? Allowing C’s action would, it may be argued, enable A to circumvent 
its obligation through a corporate entity it controlled. Of course, it seems obvious that none 
of the Law Lords who endorsed the evasion principle had such an application in mind. Their 
Lordships’ repeated emphasis on the narrowness of the principle would also militate against 
such application. Nevertheless, this example illustrates the uncertain reach of the principle, 
thus casting doubt on its usefulness. 
 
The Concealment Principle 
In Lord Sumption’s scheme, all cases that have relied on the “sham” or “façade” epithets 
but which do not involve deliberate evasion are explicable by the concealment principle. 
This principle is36 
 
… legally banal and does not involve piercing the corporate veil at all. It is that the 
interposition of a company or perhaps several companies so as to conceal the identity of 
the real actors will not deter the courts from identifying them, assuming that their identity 
is legally relevant. In these cases the court is not disregarding the “façade”, but only 
looking behind it to discover the facts which the corporate structure is concealing. 
 
His Lordship cited Gencor ACP Ltd Ltd v Dalby37 and Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2)38 to 
illustrate the concealment principle. In Gencor, a managing director (Dalby) argued that he 
was not liable to account for profits diverted from the company because the profits were 
paid, not to himself, but to Burnstead, a BVI company under his control. The court rejected 
this argument. It found that Burnstead was in substance no more than a creature or alter ego 
of Dalby used for the receipt of Dalby’s dishonest gains. An account was thus ordered 
against both Dalby and B Ltd. A similar issue was raised in Trustor, where a managing 
director (Smallbone) had misappropriated large sums of money from the company (Trustor) 
by transferring them to a company (Introcom) he controlled. Upon Trustor’s suit, Introcom 
was held liable for knowing receipt of property obtained in breach of another’s (ie, 
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Smallbone’s) fiduciary duty. Importantly, Smallbone was also held to be jointly and 
severally liable with Introcom for all the sums received by Introcom because it was thought 
appropriate to “pierce the corporate veil” to treat Introcom’s receipt as that of Smallbone. 
For Lord Sumption, however, neither Gencor nor Trustor was truly concerned with veil-
piercing. Rather, they were simply cases where the court had found as a fact that the 
controller was the true recipient of the assets in question. In each case, the remedy against 
the controller and the controlled entity is justified, not by ignoring the company’s separate 
legal status, but by the operation of equitable principles.  
This analysis of Gencor and Trustor has the obvious merit of simplifying the law by aptly 
focusing on the reality that the improper gains were ultimately intended for the controller’s 
benefit. But it does not quite explain the actual outcomes of the cases. For example, 
characterising Introcom as a mere agent or nominee for Smallbone would not explain why 
Introcom was itself liable to account for knowing receipt. If, indeed, it had merely received 
the misappropriated funds as agent or nominee of Smallbone, such receipt would be 
ministerial in nature and is insufficient for establishing recipient liability.39 It may be that 
Introcom’s liability is better founded on knowing assistance.40 Even so, it is hard to see why 
Smallbone and Introcom should be jointly and severally liable for funds received by 
Smallbone alone, for English law does not as yet impose upon an assistant joint and several 
liability for a fiduciary’s gains.41 Likewise, it is not clear if Lord Sumption’s analysis would 
justify the order of an account for profits against both Dalby and Burnstead if indeed 
Burnstead had done no more than served as a channel for Dalby’s receipt.  Seen in this light, 
the concealment principle is not entirely an accurate summation of the rationale underlying 
these non-evasion authorities.  
“Concealment” as defined by Lord Sumption also presupposes that the identity of the “real 
actor” obscured by the interposition of companies can always be discovered by a process 
independent of veil-piercing. Yet it is not clear that this is so. Consider Re Darby,42 where 
two infamous bankrupts (Darby and Gyde) set up a nominally-capitalised company (C Ltd) 
to defraud investors by promoting the issue of debentures by another company (W Ltd). The 
fraud was effected by causing C Ltd to purchase a cheap quarrying licence which was then 
sold to W Ltd at a greatly inflated value. Darby was held liable to account as a promoter for 
the profits made from this sale even though it was C Ltd that effected the sale, and despite 
the fact that C Ltd was the only named promoter in the prospectuses issued in connection 
with W Ltd’s offer of debentures. At first sight, this looks like a classic instance of 
concealment: the court had simply found as a fact that Darby was liable because he was in 
truth the promoter.43 But one may probe deeper: exactly what led the court to identify Darby 
as the promoter? Clearly, Darby’s personal involvement in promoting W Ltd is not enough: 
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he could simply have been involved as agent of C Ltd which, being inanimate, necessarily 
had to act through human agents. A better explanation may be that of implied agency,44 as 
the court could be understood to have found that Darby was, by reason of the receipt of 
profit, the true principal acting through C Ltd as his agent.45 But recent authorities have 
cautioned that such implication can only arise on the most exceptional facts,46 for the 
ordinary intention of a person who trades through a company is to exclude personal 
responsibility as principal.47 Seen as a whole, the facts of Re Darby do not lead inevitably to 
the implication of an agency relationship. Although Darby’s appropriation of profit could be 
seen as an indicium of ownership, the facts remained that it was C Ltd who held the mining 
licence and sold it to W Ltd. That the court had to pierce the veil of C Ltd (on account of 
Darby’s control and the intention to perpetrate fraud) in order to hold Darby accountable as 
promoter therefore remains a distinctly plausible explanation of the case.48  
In view of the foregoing, the concealment principle may be understood as both a restatement 
of the law as well as a prescription for its development. It underscores the important fact 
that the respective rights and liabilities of companies and their controllers can often be 
determined by reference to conventional principles without in any way encroaching on the 
separate entity rule. But it also goes further, as it seeks to expunge piercing in all but cases 
of evasion. Bearing in mind that the authorities for evasion may also be understood as 
instances of concealment, the practical effect of formulating the concealment principle in 
this manner may be to abolish the veil-piercing jurisdiction. 
 
Circumventing the corporate veil 
Whether or not one agrees with the “evasion-concealment” analysis, an unmistakable theme 
of Prest is that the jurisdiction for piercing the corporate veil is, if it exists, extraordinarily 
narrow in scope. A litigant who wishes to reach a controller for the acts of the controlled 
entity (or vice versa) will henceforth have to rely substantially, if not wholly, on 
conventional analyses. If the “evasion-concealment” framework is adopted, this is a fortiori 
so. This renewed emphasis on conventional principles is generally a step in the right 
direction as it encourages consistency and avoids the proliferation of liability through 
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(potentially) unprincipled extensions of the law. But it has to be appreciated that this 
clarification will not alter the substantive issue at hand, which is the proper allocation of 
right and liability between a company and its controller. Nor will it eliminate the occasional 
need to displace the separate entity rule in order to reach a just outcome. With the removal 
or severe curtailment of the discretion to pierce the veil, the burden of explaining such 
outcomes will simply be shifted to the conventional principles. 
Issues specific to the use of private law principles to sidestep a company’s separate status 
has been ably and comprehensively considered elsewhere.49 For present purposes, it suffices 
to consider some ways by which veil-piercing issues could re-surface in the application of 
these principles. In relation to agency, we have already seen from our discussion of Re 
Darby that the concept may sometimes be pressed into service to justify what is essentially 
an identification of a company with its controller. Similar pressure will likely be exerted on 
tort principles. Consider, for instance, the circumstances in which a controller may be held 
to be jointly liable for a company’s tort. In general, a person is jointly liable with another if 
he conspires with or procures or induces that person to commit a tort.50 Where a company is 
the primary actor, the question arises as to whether a controller could incur liability as a 
joint tortfeasor by reason of its control over the company. Plainly, an affirmative answer 
would undercut the separate entity rule. But to hold otherwise may also be unpalatable, as 
that will leave incorporators free to perpetrate (through the companies they own) torts with 
impunity. In cases where the controller is also a director, it is well established that the 
director may be liable if he has “authorised, directed, or procured” the company’s tort.51 
Precisely what level of involvement would suffice for this purpose is not, however, entirely 
settled. A relatively recent line of authorities52 appears to suggest that a director will only be 
liable if he does more than exercise constitutional control over the company (for example, 
by voting at board meetings).53 If this test were extended to shareholders generally, then it 
seems the principles of joint liability are unlikely to operate in such a way as to undermine 
the separate entity rule. But whether this ought to be so is precisely the issue, which cannot 
be resolved by looking solely to the concept of joint liability. Rather, what has to be 
mediated are the conflicting policy objectives of tort and company law, that is, the need to 
prevent and remedy torts on the one hand, and the isolation of business risks on the other.54 
The issue would have been no different if an attempt had been made to to pierce the 
corporate veil instead.  
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As a further illustration, consider the Court of Appeal’s decision in Chandler v Cape plc,55 
which held a parent company (Cape) liable for breaching a duty of care that it owed to an 
employee of its subsdiary. In deciding that such a duty was owed by Cape to the employee, 
the court placed particular emphasis on Cape’s control over the subsidiary, manifested by its 
involvement in the formulation of the subsidiary’s health and safety policies. Interestingly, 
the court emphatically disavowed that this ascription of direct responsibility to Cape was an 
instance of veil-piercing.56 But it must be obvious, on reflection, that the liberal imposition 
of such liability could make signficant inroads into the separate entity rule.  If a parent 
company could, by exercising control through the formulation of “group” policies, be 
regarded as having assumed responsibility to third parties dealing with the subsidiary, then it 
would seem that a parent company’s potential liability for the conduct of its subsidiaries is 
considerably broadened.57 Once again, this was a situation where the proper resolution of 
the issue required considerations of both tort and company law objectives, namely, the 
extent to which a company could be permitted to limit its tort liability through the 
incorporation of subsidiaries. To approach the question purely as a matter of tort law risked 
excluding from the outset the legitimate concerns of company law. 
 
Preserving veil-piercing: a suggested framework 
Thus far, the argument made is that the evasion-concealment analysis results in the virtual 
abrogation of the veil-piercing jurisdiction. On this understanding, Lord Sumption’s 
framework is ultimately inconsistent with their Lordships’ (with the possible exception of 
Lord Walker) professed desire to preserve veil-piercing as a means of countering abuse. But 
to reject this framework appears, once again, to leave the law in a state of vacuity, for where 
would that leave litigants in search of guidance?  
It is submitted that the jurisdiction for veil-piercing need not descend into a state of anarchy 
merely because there is no single principle that defines the circumstances for its operation. 
To make sense of this jurisdiction, it is important to bear in mind that “abuse” is a broad 
concept that may occur in a wide range of situations. That being the case, any attempt to 
reduce the jurisdiction to rigid definitions will invariably prove to be futile and frustrating. 
Rather, the jurisdiction is rightly framed as a discretion, which reflects the latitude needed to 
respond to the myriad forms by which “abuse” may assume. As every argument to pierce 
the corporate veil is essentially an invitation to the court to uphold a right or policy concern 
that competes with those underlying the separate entity rule, clarity and cohernce is only 
achieved by directly addressing the interests at stake, rather than by applying a set of fixed 
rules.  
That is not, however, to say that courts should be given carte blanche to pierce the corporate 
veil. Rather, their exercise of discretion has to be exercised in a principled manner. Thus, it 
                                                          
55
 [2012] 1 WLR 3111. 
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 [2012] 1 WLR 3111 at [69]. 
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 See the critique of M Petrin, “Assumption of Responsibility in Corporate Groups: Chandler v Cape plc” 
(2013) 76 MLR 603. 
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is trite that the mere facts of control and ownership are not sufficient reasons for piercing the 
veil. Nor can it be pierced simply because it is in the interests of justice to do so. What is 
needed is proof that the controller has exercised its control over a company to perpetrate or 
conceal wrongdoing, and for this purpose it is necessary to demonstrate a substantive link 
between the wrongdoing and the company’s involvement.58 To these Prest adds the critical 
“last-resort” principle –that the corporate veil ought not to be pierced when an effective 
remedy may be achieved through other, more conventional, legal principles. It is true there 
is as yet no absolute clarity as to what this principle entails. Presumably, in a typical case 
where the veil is sought to be pierced to impose liability on a controller for the acts of its 
company, it is not sufficient for this purpose to show that the company is not worth suing 
because it is insolvent.  The evidence must go futher to show that there is no other effective 
remedy against the controller.  
A further stricture identified by Lord Sumption is that the jurisdiction cannot be applied to 
create a new liability where none existed before.59 This was a principle drawn from VTB 
Capital plc v Nutritek International Corpn,60 which the Supreme Court had held that a 
controller could not, by piercing the veil of a company he owned, be made a party to a 
contract entered into by that company. As regards consensual liability, this holding is clearly 
right. A party who contracts with a company must, ordinarily, be taken to have accepted the 
risk of loss arising from its default. The privity rule should not therefore be displaced simply 
to enable an injured party to pursue those with deeper pockets. But it is doubtful if this 
restriction should also be extended to cases involving non-consensual liability, such as 
Trustor AB v Smallbone (No 2).61 Here, the creation of new liability is necessary for giving 
effect to an equitable remedy. It does not undermine any prior allocation of risk. In this 
context, a more pertinent objection to the imposition of fresh liability may lie in the risk of 
prejudicing rights of third parties (in particular, the creditors of the party on whom liability 
is imposed). This may therefore warrant a further restriction that the discretion to pierce the 
corporate veil be exercised only where the court is satisfied that it would not unduly affect 
third-party rights. 
 
Conclusion 
Lord Sumption’s approach in Prest has been described as “legalistic, formalist and technical 
and which expressly avoids looking at the substance and economic effects.”62 This approach 
has the benefit of promoting certainty, and rightly emphasises the primacy of general legal 
principles in resolving disputes involving companies. Nevertheless, if it were thought (as the 
court did in Prest) that the discretion to disregard the separate entity rule had to be preserved 
to deter any abuse of the corporate form, then this discretion ought to be given real content. 
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This would mean that it should, prima facie, be available where it is established that the 
company had been used by those in control to perpetrate or conceal serious impropriety. But 
as is the case with discretionary power in general, its exercise should be constrained by 
clearly articulated principles. Properly framed, these principles will go a long way in giving 
clarity and coherence to this difficult area of law.  
 
